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Abstract
In decentralized learning, data is distributed among local clients which collabo-
ratively train a shared prediction model using secure aggregation. To preserve
the privacy of the clients, modern decentralized learning paradigms require each
client to maintain a private local training data set and only upload their summarized
model updates to the server. However, this can quickly lead to a degenerate model
and collapse in performance when corrupted updates (e.g., adversarial manipula-
tions) are aggregated at the server. In this work, we present a robust decentralized
learning framework, Decent_BVA, using bias-variance based adversarial training
via asymmetrical communications between each client and the server. The exper-
iments are conducted on neural networks with cross-entropy loss. Nevertheless,
the proposed framework allows the use of various classification loss functions
(e.g., cross-entropy loss, mean squared error loss) where the gradients of the bias
and variance are tractable to be estimated from local clients’ models. In this case,
any gradient-based adversarial training strategies could be used by taking the bias-
variance oriented adversarial examples into consideration, e.g., bias-variance based
FGSM and PGD proposed in this paper. Experiments show that Decent_BVA is
robust to the classical adversarial attacks when the level of corruption is high while
being competitive compared with conventional decentralized learning in terms of
the model’s accuracy and efficiency.
1 Introduction
The explosive amount of decentralized user data collected from the ever-growing usage of smart
devices, e.g., smartphones, wearable devices, home sensors, etc., has led to a surge of interest in the
field of decentralized learning. To protect the privacy-sensitive data of the clients, privacy-preserving
decentralized learning [21, 41] has been proposed. It decentralizes the model learning by allowing
a large number of clients to train local models using their own data, and then collectively merges
the clients’ models on a central server by secure aggregation [1]. Privacy-preserving decentralized
learning has attracted much attention in recent years with the prevalence of efficient light-weight
deep models [16] and low-cost network communications [38].
In decentralized learning, the central server can only inspect the secure aggregation of the local
models as a whole. Consequently, it is susceptible to corrupted updates from the clients (system
failures, adversarial manipulations, etc.). Recently, multiple robust decentralized learning models [10,
27, 28, 24] have been proposed. However, these works only focus on performing client-level model
poisoning attacks or designing server-level aggregation variants with hyper-parameter tuning, and
largely ignore the underlying true cause of decentralized learning’s vulnerability that comes from the
server’s generalization error.
Our work bridges this gap by investigating the loss incurred during secure aggregation of decentralized
learning from the perspective of bias-variance decomposition [26, 36]. Specifically, we show that
the untargeted adversarial attacks over the central server can be decomposed as bias attack and
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variance attack over multiple local clients, where the bias measures the loss triggered by the main
prediction of these clients, and the variance measures the variations among clients’ model predictions.
In this way, we can perform adversarial training on local models by receiving a small amount of
bias-variance perturbed data from the server via asymmetrical communication. The experiments are
conducted on neural networks with cross-entropy loss, however, other loss functions are also allowed
as long as their gradients in terms of bias and variance are tractable to be estimated from local clients’
models. In this way, any gradient-based adversarial training strategies could be used by taking the
bias-variance oriented adversarial examples into consideration, e.g., bias-variance based FGSM and
PGD proposed in this paper. Compared with previous work, our major contributions include:
• We give the exact solution of bias-variance analysis in terms of the generalization error for neural
network based decentralized learning.
• Without violating the clients’ privacy, we show that providing a tiny amount of bias-variance
perturbed data to the clients through asymmetrical communication could significantly improve the
robustness of the server model. In contrast, the conventional decentralized learning framework is
vulnerable to the strong attacking methods with increasing communication rounds.
• We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate the robustness of our proposed framework
against adversarial attacks.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
In decentralized learning, there are a central server and K different clients, each with access to a
private training set Dk = {(xki , tki )}nki=1, where xki , tki , and nk are the features, label, and number of
training examples in the kth client (k = 1, 2 · · · ,K). The raw data Dk must not be shared with the
server and other clients. In addition, there is a small public training set Ds = {(xsj , tsj)}nsj=1 with ns
training examples in the server which could be shared with clients. The goal of decentralized learning
is to train a global classifier f(·) using knowledge from all the clients such that it generalizes well
over test data Dtest. The notation used in this paper is summarized in the Appendix (see Table 3).
2.2 Problem Definition
Privacy-preserving decentralized learning trains the machine learning models without directly access-
ing to the clients’ raw data. A large number of clients could collaborate in achieving the learning
objective under the coordination of a central server which aggregates the asynchronous local clients’
parameters [17]. In this paper, we study the adversarial robustness of neural networks2 in the
decentralized learning setting, and we formulate robust decentralized learning as follows.
Definition 2.1. (Robust Decentralized Learning)
Input: (1). A set of private training data {Dk}Kk=1 on K different clients; (2). Limited training dataDs on the central server; (3). Learning algorithm f(·) and loss function L(·, ·).
Output: A trained model on the central server that is robust against adversarial perturbation.
We would like to point out that our problem definition has the following properties:
• Asymmetrical communication: In our design, the asymmetrical communication between each
client and server cloud is allowed: the server provides both global model parameters and limited
training data to the clients; while each client uploads its local parameters back to the server.
• Data distribution: In this paper, we assume that all training examples of the clients and the server
follow the same data distribution. However, the experiments show that our proposed algorithm
also achieves satisfactory performance in the non-IID setting, which is typical among personalized
clients (e.g., users’ mobile devices [15]) producing the non-IID local data sets in real scenarios.
• Shared learning algorithm: We assume that all the clients would use the identical model f(·),
including model architectures as well as hyper-parameters (e.g., learning rate, local epochs, local
batch size), which could be assigned by the central server.
2Our theoretical contribution mainly focuses on classification using neural networks with cross-entropy loss
and mean squared loss. However, the proposed framework is generic to allow the use of other classification loss
functions as well.
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2.3 Bias-Variance Trade-off
Following [26, 36], we define the optimal prediction, main prediction as well as the bias, variance
and noise for any real-valued loss function L(·, ·) as follows:
Definition 2.2. (Optimal Prediction and Main Prediction) Given a loss function L(·, ·) and learn-
ing algorithm f(·), the optimal prediction y∗ and main prediction ym for an example are defined as
follows:
y∗(x) = arg min
y
Et[L(y, t)] and ym(x) = arg min
y′
ED[L(fD(x), y′)] (1)
where D is the training set and fD denotes the model trained using D. In short, the main prediction is
the prediction whose average loss relative to all the predictions over data distributions is minimum,
e.g., the main prediction for zero-one loss is the mode of predictions. In this work, we show that the
main prediction is the average prediction of client models for mean squared loss and cross-entropy
loss in Section 4.1.
Definition 2.3. (Bias, Variance and Noise) Given a loss function L(·, ·) and learning algorithm
f(·), the expected loss ED,t[L(fD(x), t)] for an example x can be decomposed3 into bias, variance
and noise as follows:
B(x) = L(ym, y∗) and V (x) = ED[L(fD(x), ym)] and N(x) = Et[L(y∗, t)] (2)
In short, bias is the loss incurred by the main prediction w.r.t. the optimal prediction, and variance is
the average loss incurred by predictions w.r.t. the main prediction. Noise is conventionally assumed
to be irreducible and independent to f(·).
Remark. Our definitions on optimal prediction, main prediction, bias, variance and noise slightly
differ from previous ones [26, 36]. For example, conventional optimal prediction was defined as
y∗(x) = arg miny Et[L(t, y)], and it is equivalent to our definition when loss function is symmetric
over its arguments, i.e., L(y1, y2) = L(y2, y1). But it does not hold for non-symmetric loss functions.
3 The Proposed Framework
A typical framework [17] of privacy-preserving decentralized learning can be summarized as follows:
(1) Client Update: Each client updates local model parameters wk by minimizing the empirical loss
over its own training set; (2) Forward Communication: Each client uploads its model updates to the
central server; (3) Server Update: It synchronously aggregates the received parameters; (4) Backward
Communication: The global parameters are sent back to the clients. Our framework follows the same
paradigm but with substantial modifications:
Server Update. Server has two components: The first component uses FedAvg [21] algorithm to
aggregate the local models’ parameters, i.e., wG = Aggregate(w1, w2, · · · , wK) =
∑K
k=1
nk
n wk
where n =
∑K
k=1 nk and wk is the model parameters in the k
th client. Meanwhile, another
component is designed to produce adversarially perturbed examples which could be induced by a
poisoning attack algorithm for the usage of robust adversarial training.
It has been well studied [4, 26, 36] that in the classification setting, the generalization error of a
learning algorithm on an example is determined by the irreducible noise, bias and variance terms as
defined in Eq. (2). Similar to the previous work, we also assume a noise free learning scenario where
the class label t is a deterministic function of x (i.e., if x is sampled repeatedly, the same values of its
class t will be observed). This motivates us to generate the adversarial examples by attacking the bias
and variance terms induced by clients’ models as:
max
xˆ∈Ω(x)
B(xˆ;w1, · · · , wK) + λV (xˆ;w1, · · · , wK) ∀(x, t) ∈ Ds (3)
where B(xˆ;w1, · · · , wK) and V (xˆ;w1, · · · , wK) could be empirically estimated from a finite num-
ber of local training sets {D1,D2, · · · ,DK}. Here λ is a hyper-parameter to measure the trade-off of
bias and variance, and Ω(x) is the perturbation constraint.
Note that Ds, which is on the server, is the candidate subset of all available training examples
that would lead to their perturbed counterparts. This is a more feasible setting as compared to
3This decomposition is based on the weighted sum of bias, variance, and noise.
3
generating adversarial examples on clients’ devices because the server usually has much powerful
computational capacity in real scenarios that allows the usage of flexible poisoning attack algorithms.
In this case, both poisoned examples and server model parameters would be sent back to each client
(Backward Communication), while only clients’ local parameters would be uploaded to the server
(Forward Communication), i.e., the asymmetrical communication between the clients and the server
as discussed in Section 2.2.
Client Update. The robust training of one client’s prediction model (i.e., wk) can be formulated as
the following minimization problem.
min
wk
 nk∑
i=1
L(fDk(x
k
i ;wk), t
k
i ) +
ns∑
j=1
L(fDk(xˆ
s
j ;wk), t
s
j)
 (4)
where xˆsj ∈ Ω(xsj) is the perturbed counterpart of clean example xsj asymmetrically transmitted from
the server.
Remark. Intuitively, in the noise-free scenarios, bias measures the systematic loss of a learning
algorithm, and variance measures the prediction consistency of the learner over different training
sets. Therefore, our robust decentralized learning framework has the following advantages: (i) it
encourages the clients to consistently produce the optimal prediction for perturbed examples, thereby
leading to better generalization performance; (ii) local adversarial training on perturbed examples
allows to learn a robust local model, and thus a robust global model could be aggregated from clients.
Theoretically, we could still have another possible robust decentralized training strategy:
min
wk
nk∑
i=1
max
xˆki ∈Ω(xki )
L(f(xˆki ;wk), t
k
i ) ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K} (5)
where the local candidate set of available training examples for each client k that can have their
perturbation counterparts is Dk. Following [20, 34], one intuitive interpretation of this framework is
considered as a composition of inner maximization and outer minimization problems. Specifically,
the inner maximization problem aims to synthesize the adversarial counterparts of clean examples,
while the outer minimization problem finds the optimal model parameters over perturbed training
examples. In this way, each local robust model is trained individually and the global server model
is aggregated from them. One major limitation of this method is that poisoning attacks on clients
could largely increase the computational cost and memory usage. This might not be feasible due to
the client’s limited storage and computational capacity (e.g., a mobile device [15]) in real scenarios.
4 Algorithm
4.1 Bias-Variance Attack
We first consider the maximization problem in Eq. (3) using bias-variance based adversarial attacks.
It aims to find the adversarial example xˆ (from the original example x) that would produce large bias
and variance values w.r.t. clients’ local models. Specifically, perturbation constraint xˆ ∈ Ω(x) forces
the adversarial example xˆ to be visually indistinguishable w.r.t. x. Here we consider the well-studied
l∞-bounded adversaries [13, 20, 34] such that Ω(x) := {xˆ
∣∣||xˆ − x||∞ ≤ } for a perturbation
magnitude . Furthermore, we propose to consider the following two gradient-based algorithms to
generate adversarial examples with bounded l∞ norm.
Bias-variance based Fast Gradient Sign Method (BV-FGSM): Following FGSM [13], it linearizes
the maximization problem in Eq. (3) with one-step attack as follows.
xˆBV−FGSM := x+  · sign (∇x (B(x;w1, · · · , wK) + λV (x;w1, · · · , wK))) (6)
Bias-variance based Projected Gradient Descent (BV-PGD): PGD can be considered as a multi-
step variant of FGSM [19] and might generate powerful adversarial examples. This motivated us to
derive a BV-based PGD attack:
xˆl+1BV−PGD := ProjΩ(x)
(
xˆl +  · sign (∇xˆl (B(xˆl;w1, · · · , wK) + λV (xˆl;w1, · · · , wK)))) (7)
where xˆl is the adversarial example at the lth step with the initialization xˆ0 = x and ProjΩ(x)(·)
projects each step onto Ω(x).
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Remark. The proposed framework could be naturally generalized to any gradient-based adversarial
attack algorithms where the gradients of bias B(·) and variance V (·) w.r.t. x are tractable when
estimated from finite training sets. Compared with the existing attack methods [7, 13, 19, 23], our
loss function the adversary aims to optimize is a linear combination of bias and variance, whereas
existing work largely focused on attacking the overall classification error that considers bias only.
The following theorem states that bias B(·) and variance V (·) as well as their gradients over input x
could be estimated using the clients’ models.
Theorem 4.1. Assume that L(·, ·) is the cross-entropy loss function, then the empirical estimated
main prediction ym for an input example (x, t) has the following closed-form expression:
ym(x;w1, · · · , wK) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk)
Furthermore, the empirical bias and variance as well as their gradients over input x are estimated as:
B(x;w1, · · · , wK) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
L(fDk(x;wk), t) and V (x;w1, · · · , wK) = L(ym, ym) = H(ym)
∇xB(x;w1, · · · , wK) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
∇xL(fDk(x;wk), t)
∇xV (x;w1, · · · , wK) = − 1
K
K∑
k=1
C∑
j=1
(log y(j)m + 1) · ∇xf (j)Dk (x;wk)
where H(ym) = −
∑C
j=1 y
(j)
m log y
(j)
m is the entropy of the main prediction ym and C is the number
of classes.
In addition to the commonly used cross-entropy loss in neural networks, we also consider the case
where L(·, ·) is the mean squared error (MSE) loss function. Then, the empirical estimated main
prediction ym for an input example (x, t) has the following closed-form expression:
ym(x;w1, · · · , wK) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk)
Furthermore, the empirical bias and unbiased variance are estimated as:
B(x;w1, · · · , wK) = || 1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk)− t||22
V (x;w1, · · · , wK) = 1
K − 1
K∑
k=1
||fDk(x;wk)−
1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk)||22
Remark. In this paper, we focus on studying the robust decentralized learning problem using neural
network model with cross-entropy loss function. Notice that in our framework, the decentralized
training of neural networks with MSE loss function might have weaker robustness and higher
computational complexity compared to cross-entropy loss function (see Appendix 8.3.1).
4.2 Decent_BVA
We present a novel robust decentralized learning algorithm with our proposed bias-variance attacks,
named Decent_BVA. Following the framework in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4), key components to our
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Algorithm 1 Decent_BVA
1: Input: K (number of clients, with local
data sets {Dk}Kk=1 indexed by k); f (learn-
ing model), E (number of local epochs);
F (fraction of clients selected on each
round); B (batch size of local client); η
(learning rate); Ds (data set on server); 
(perturbation magnitude).
2: Initialization: Initialize w0G and Dˆs = ∅
3: for each round r = 1, 2, · · · do
4: m = max(F ·K, 1)
5: Sr ← randomly sampled m clients
6: for each client k ∈ Sr in parallel do
7: wrk ← ClientUpdate(wr−1G , Dˆs, k)
8: end for
9: Dˆs ← BVAttack(Ds, {wrk}|k ∈ Sr)
10: wrG ← Aggregate(wrk|k ∈ Sr)
11: end for
12: return wG
Algorithm 2 ClientUpdate(w, Dˆs, k)
1: Initialize kth client’s model with w
2: B ← split Dk ∪ Dˆs into batches of size B
3: for each local epoch i = 1, 2, · · · , E do
4: for local batch (x, t) ∈ B do
5: w ← w − η∇L(fDk(x;w), t)
6: end for
7: end for
8: return w
Algorithm 3 BVAttack(Ds, {wrk}|k ∈ Sr)
1: Initialize Dˆs = ∅
2: for (x, t) ∈ Ds do
3: Estimate the gradients ∇xB(x) and∇xV (x)
using Theorem 4.1
4: Calculate xˆ using Eq. (6) or (7) and add to Dˆs
5: end for
6: return Dˆs
algorithm are: bias-variance attacks for generating adversarial examples on the server, and adversarial
training with poisoned server examples and clean local examples on each client. Therefore, a robust
decentralized learning model could be optimized by iteratively updating the adversarial examples and
local model parameters.
The proposed algorithm is summarized in Alg. 1. It is given the server’s Ds and clients’ training
data {Dk}Kk=1 as input, and outputs a robust global model on the server. To begin with, it initializes
the server’s model parameter wG and perturbed data Dˆs, and then assigns to the randomly selected
clients (Steps 4-5). Each client optimizes its own local model with the received parameters w and Dˆs
(Steps 6-8), and then uploads the updated parameters back to the server. Then, the server updates the
perturbed data Dˆs (Step 9) using our proposed bias-variance attack algorithm (see Alg. 3) and global
model parameters (Step 10) using an aggregation method, e.g., FedAvg [21].
Specifically, for client update (see Alg. 2), each client initializes its local model fD(·) with the
received global parameters wG, and then optimizes the local model with its own clean data Dk
and the received data Dˆs. Following [21, 40], considering the neural network model f(·), we use
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) to train E epochs with local learning rate η and batch size B in
each client.
5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the adversarial robustness of our proposed algorithm on three benchmark
data sets: MNIST4, Fashion-MNIST5, CIFAR-106.
5.1 Baselines
The baseline models we use include: (1). FedAvg: the classical federated averaging model [21]. (2).
Decent_Baseline: The simplified version of our proposed method where the local clients are robustly
trained using [20] but the asymmetrical transmitted perturbed data are generated using the gradients
from FedAvg’s aggregation on the server. (3)-(5). Decent_Bias, Decent_Variance, Decent_BVA: Our
proposed methods, similar to Decent_Baseline but the asymmetrical transmitted perturbed data is
generated using the gradients from bias-only attack, variance-only attack, and bias-variance attack
respectively. (6). FedAvg_Robust_Local: Each client performs its own adversarial training using
Eq. (5); then, their model updates are aggregated on the server using FedAvg. (7). Decent_BVA_Local:
A combination of baselines (5) and (6). Note that the latter two baselines have high computational
requirements on client devices and may not be applicable in real scenarios.
4http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist
5https://github.com/zalandoresearch/fashion-mnist
6https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~kriz/cifar.html
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Figure 1: Visualizations of bias, variance,
bias+variance, and perturbed images for MNIST.
Figure 2: Bias-variance curve w.r.t. the CNN model
complexity on MNIST.
Figure 3: Convergence on
Fashion-MNIST
Figure 4: Performance on
Fashion-MNIST
Figure 5: Efficiency on Fashion-
MNIST
5.2 Setting
Regarding the defense model architecture, we use 4-layer CNNs (2 convolutional layers and 2 fully
connected layers) for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. For CIFAR-10, a 9-layer CNN (6 convolutional
layers and 3 fully connected layers) model is used. The detailed designs are illustrated in the
Appendix. The training is performed using SGD optimizer with fixed learning rate of 0.01 and
momentum of value 0.9. Total number of clients is 100 and the fraction of clients that are sampled to
perform training is set as F = 0.1; the asymmetrically transmitted data is randomly sampled and
has the size of ns = 64; the local batch size B of each client is 64, and the local training epochs
E of each client are 50, 50, 10 for the three data sets respectively. We empirically demonstrate that
these hyper-parameter settings are preferable in terms of both training accuracy and robustness.
Please see the details in Fig. 6 - Fig. 14 in the Appendix. For the adversarial training of the clients,
the perturbed examples are generated by poisoning the training set using our proposed BV-FGSM
attack algorithm. To evaluate the robustness of our decentralized learning algorithm against existing
adversarial attacks, except for the clean model training, we perform FGSM [13], 10-step PGD [19],
and 20-step PGD [19] towards the aggregated server model on the test set Dtest. Following [13, 37],
the maximum perturbations allowed are  = 0.3 for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, and  = 8255 for
CIFAR-10. For IID sampling, the data is first shuffled and partitioned into 100 parts for 100 clients
respectively; For non-IID setting, data is divided into 200 shards based on sorted example labels, then
assigns each client with 2 shards. In such case, each client will have data with at most two classes.
5.3 Result Analysis
To analyze the properties of our proposed Decent_BVA framework, in Fig. 1, we first visualize
the extracted gradients using bias attack, variance attack, and bias-variance attack. Notice that the
gradients of bias and variance are similar but with subtle differences in local pixel areas. However,
according to Theorem 4.1, the gradient calculation of these two are quite different: bias requires
the target label as input, but variance only needs the model output and main prediction. From
another perspective, we also investigate the bias-variance magnitude relationship with varying model
complexity. As shown in Fig. 2, with increasing model complexity (more convolutional filters in
CNN), both bias and variance decrease. This result is different from the double-descent curve or bell-
shape variance curve claimed in [4, 42]. The reasons are twofold: First, their bias-variance definitions
are from the MSE regression decomposition perspective, whereas our decomposition utilizes the
concept of main prediction and the generalization error is decomposed from the classification
perspective; Second, their implementations only evaluate the bias and variance using training batches
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IID non-IID
Clean FGSM PGD-10 PGD-20 Clean FGSM PGD-10 PGD-20
FedAvg 0.9863 0.5875 0.6203 0.2048 0.9462 0.1472 0.5254 0.0894
Decent_Baseline 0.9849 0.7374 0.7145 0.4158 0.9596 0.5630 0.5948 0.3149
Decent_Bias 0.9840 0.7627 0.7671 0.5154 0.9597 0.6510 0.6226 0.3614
Decent_Variance 0.9834 0.7594 0.7616 0.5253 0.9577 0.5979 0.5990 0.3504
Decent_BVA 0.9837 0.7756 0.7927 0.5699 0.9671 0.6696 0.6953 0.4717
FedAvg_Robust_Local 0.9747 0.9028 0.9268 0.8595 0.9265 0.7695 0.8435 0.7422
Decent_BVA_Local 0.9739 0.9185 0.9329 0.8874 0.9543 0.8059 0.8582 0.7447
Table 1: Adversarial robustness on MNIST with IID and non-IID settings
Fashion-MNIST CIFAR-10
Clean FGSM PGD-10 PGD-20 Clean FGSM PGD-10 PGD-20
FedAvg 0.8785 0.2971 0.0406 0.0188 0.7887 0.1477 0.0337 0.0254
Decent_Baseline 0.8628 0.5029 0.1977 0.1628 0.7793 0.2079 0.0866 0.0753
Decent_Bias 0.8655 0.5407 0.1934 0.1689 0.7760 0.2043 0.0894 0.0769
Decent_Variance 0.8617 0.5334 0.1935 0.1628 0.7810 0.1969 0.0799 0.0693
Decent_BVA 0.8597 0.5506 0.2002 0.1799 0.7812 0.2119 0.0890 0.0771
FedAvg_Robust_Local 0.8542 0.7424 0.2880 0.1692 0.7672 0.2796 0.1929 0.1892
Decent_BVA_Local 0.8358 0.7163 0.3973 0.2626 0.7676 0.2803 0.1935 0.1892
Table 2: Adversarial robustness on Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10
on one central model and thus is different from the definition which requires the variance to be
estimated from multiple sub-models (in our scenario, client models).
The convergence plot of all baseline methods is presented in Fig. 3. We observe that FedAvg has
the best convergence, and all robust training will have a slightly higher loss upon convergence. This
matches the observations in [20] which states that training performance may be sacrificed in order to
provide robustness for small capacity networks. As for the robustness performance shown in Fig. 4,
we observe that the aggregation of decentralized learning is vulnerable to adversarial attacks since
both FedAvg and FedAvg_Robust_Local have decreased performance with an increasing number of
server-client communications. Other baselines that utilized the asymmetrical communications have
increasing robustness with more communication rounds although only a small number of perturbed
examples (ns = 64) are transmitted. We also observe that when communication rounds reach 70,
Decent_BVA starts to have similar performance as FedAvg_Robust_Local while the latter is more
resource-demanding as shown in Fig. 5, where the pie plot size represents the running time. Overall,
asymmetrical communications with perturbations increase model robustness and bias-variance based
adversarial training is more effective for decentralized learning.
For the comprehensive experiments shown in Table 1, it is easy to verify that our proposed model
outperforms all other baselines regardless of the source of the perturbed examples (i.e., locally gener-
ated like FedAvg_Robust_Local or asymmetrically transmitted from the server like Decent_BVA).
Comparing with standard robust decentralized training Decent_Baseline, the performance of De-
cent_BVA against adversarial attacks still increases 4%− 15% and 10%− 16% on IID and non-IID
settings respectively, although Decent_BVA is theoretically suitable for the cases that clients have IID
samples. In Table 2, we observe a similar trend where Decent_BVA outperforms Decent_Baseline on
FashionMNIST (with 0.3%− 5% increases) and on CIFAR-10 (with 0.2%− 0.4% increases) when
defending different types of adversarial examples. For results that use local adversarial training, we
only see comparable results. Our conjecture is that local adversarial training is already able to gener-
ate high-quality perturbed examples and adding more similar ones from asymmetrical communication
would not have much space for improving the model robustness.
6 Related Work
Adversarial Machine Learning: While machine learning models have achieved remarkable per-
formance over clean inputs, recent work [13, 32] showed that those trained models are vulnerable
to adversarially chosen examples by adding the imperceptive noise to the clean inputs. In gen-
eral, the adversarial robustness of centralized machine learning models have been explored from
the following aspects: adversarial attacks [6, 22, 7, 30, 14, 2, 44], defense (or robust model train-
ing) [20, 34, 39, 8, 31, 33] and interpretable adversarial robustness [29, 9, 12, 43, 35].
Decentralized Learning: Decentralized learning with preserved privacy [18, 21, 15] has become
prevalent in recent years. Meanwhile, the vulnerability of decentralized learning to backdoor attacks
has also been explored by [3, 5, 40]. Following their work, multiple robust decentralized learning
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models [10, 27, 28, 24] are also proposed and studied. In this paper, we studied the underlying true
cause of decentralized learning’s vulnerability from the perspective of bias-variance analysis. This is
in sharp contrast to the existing work that focused on performing client-level model poisoning attacks
or designing server-level aggregation variants with hyper-parameter tuning.
Bias-Variance Decomposition: Bias-Variance Decomposition (BVD) [11] was originally introduced
to analyze the generalization error of a learning algorithm. Then a generalized BVD [26, 36] was
studied in the classification setting which enabled flexible loss functions (e.g., squared loss, zero-one
loss). More recently, bias-variance trade-off was experimentally evaluated on modern neural network
models [25, 4, 42].
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel framework for robust decentralized learning, where the loss
incurred during the server’s aggregation stage is dissected into a bias part and a variance part. Our
approach improves the model robustness through adversarial training by letting the server share a few
perturbed samples to the clients via asymmetrical communications. Extensive experiments have been
conducted where we evaluated its performance from various aspects on a few benchmark data sets.
We believe the further exploration of this direction will lead to more findings on the robustness of
decentralized learning.
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Broader Impact
In this paper, researchers introduce Decent_BVA, a decentralized learning approach that learns a
shared prediction model that is robust against corrupted data collected from the client devices.
Decent_BVA could be applied to multiple types of real-life applications, including but not limited to
internet of things, telecommunications, medical diagnosis, etc. In these domains, the new trend of
research is collaboratively speeding up the model development with improved personalized features
while preserving user privacy via decentralized learning. Our research could be used to enhance the
robustness of these applications, avoiding the systematic collapse of the central model due to a few
local compromised client devices.
We envision future research to continue along the direction of understanding the bias and variance
incurred in the decentralized aggregation stage of model learning, especially their influences on user
experience and privacy protection.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Notation Summary
Table 3: Notation
Notation Definition
Ds = {(xsi , tsi )}nsi=1 Training set with ns examples in the central serverDtest Test data set in the central server
Dk = {(xki , tki )}nki=1 Local training set with nk examples in the kth client
C Number of label classes in the training set, i.e., t ∈ RC
K Number of clients
f(·) Learning algorithm
L(·, ·) Loss function over prediction and target
y∗, ym Optimal prediction and main prediction
B(·), V (·), N(·) Expected bias, variance and irreducible noise
E[·] Expected value
Dp Candidate training set for poisoning attack
wk Local model parameters over Dk
wG Server’s global model parameters
fDk(x;wk) (fDk for short) Local model prediction on x with parameters wk
Aggregate(w1, w2, · · · , wK) Synchronous aggregation function over local parameters
B(·;w1, · · · , wK) Empirical estimated bias over training sets {D1, · · · ,DK}
V (·;w1, · · · , wK) Empirical estimated variance over training sets {D1, · · · ,DK}
E Number of local epochs
F Fraction of clients selected on each round
B Batch size of local client
η Learning rate
Ω(·) Perturbation constraint
 Perturbation magnitude
xˆ Adversarial counterpart of an example x, i.e., xˆ ∈ Ω(x)
H(·) Entropy
8.2 Proof of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Theorem 4.1 states that assume L(·, ·) is the cross-entropy loss function, then
the empirical estimated main prediction ym for an input example (x, t) has the following closed-form
expression:
ym(x;w1, · · · , wK) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk)
Furthermore, the empirical bias and variance as well as their gradients over input x are estimated as:
B(x;w1, · · · , wK) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
L(fDk(x;wk), t) and V (x;w1, · · · , wK) = L(ym, ym) = H(ym)
∇xB(x;w1, · · · , wK) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
∇xL(fDk(x;wk), t)
∇xV (x;w1, · · · , wK) = − 1
K
K∑
k=1
C∑
j=1
(log y(j)m + 1) · ∇xf (j)Dk (x;wk)
where H(ym) = −
∑C
j=1 y
(j)
m log y
(j)
m is the entropy of the optimal prediction ym and C is the
number of classes.
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Proof. We first calculate the main prediction. Let
M = 1
K
K∑
k=1
L(fDk(x;wk), y
′)
= − 1
K
K∑
k=1
(
fDk(x;wk) · log y′ + (1− fDk(x;wk)) · log (1− y′)
)
Take the derivative ofM with respect to y′, we have
∂M
∂y′
= − 1
K
K∑
k=1
(fDk(x;wk)
y′
− 1− fDk(x;wk)
1− y′
)
= − 1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk)− y′
y′(1− y′)
By letting ∂M/∂y′ = 0, we have
ym(x;w1, · · · , wK) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk)
Then for bias and variance, we have,
B(x;w1, · · · , wK) = L
( 1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk), t
)
= − 1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk) · log t+
(
1− 1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk)
)
· log(1− log t)
= − 1
K
K∑
k=1
(
fDk(x;wk) · log t+ (1− fDk(x;wk)) · log(1− log t)
)
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
L(fDk(x;wk), t)
and
V (x) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
L(fDk(x;wk), ym)
= − 1
K
K∑
k=1
(
fDk(x;wk) log ym + (1− fDk(x;wk)) log(1− log ym)
)
= −ym log ym − (1− ym) log(1− log ym)
= L(ym, ym)
= H(ym)
which completes the proof.
8.3 Additional Experiments
8.3.1 MSE v.s. Cross-entropy
Both cross-entropy and mean squared error (MSE) loss functions could be used for training a neural
network model. In our paper, the loss function of neural networks determines the derivation of bias
and variance terms used for producing the adversarial examples. More specifically, we show that
when using cross-entropy loss function, the empirical estimate of bias and variance as well as their
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gradients over input x are as follows:
BCE(x;w1, · · · , wK) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
L(fDk(x;wk), t) and VCE(x;w1, · · · , wK) = H(ym)
∇xBCE(x;w1, · · · , wK) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
∇xL(fDk(x;wk), t)
∇xVCE(x;w1, · · · , wK) = − 1
K
K∑
k=1
C∑
j=1
(log y(j)m + 1) · ∇xf (j)Dk (x;wk)
In the similar way, we show that when using MSE loss function, the empirical estimate of bias and
variance as well as their gradients over input x are as follows:
BMSE(x;w1, · · · , wK) = || 1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk)− t||22
VMSE(x;w1, · · · , wK) = 1
K − 1
K∑
k=1
||fDk(x;wk)−
1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk)||22
and
∇xBMSE(x;w1, · · · , wK) =
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk)− t
)(
1
K
K∑
k=1
∇xfDk(x;wk)
)
∇xVMSE(x;w1, · · · , wK)
=
1
K − 1
K∑
k=1
((
fDk(x;wk)−
1
K
K∑
k=1
fDk(x;wk)
)(
∇xfDk(x;wk)−
1
K
K∑
k=1
∇xfDk(x;wk)
))
It can be seen that the empirical estimate of ∇xBMSE(x;w1, · · · , wK) has much higher compu-
tational complexity than ∇xBCE(x;w1, · · · , wK) because it involves the gradient calculation of
prediction vector fDk(x;wk) over the input tensor x. Besides, it is easy to show that the empirical
estimate of∇xVMSE(x;w1, · · · , wK) is also computationally expensive.
We empirically compare the cross-entropy and MSE loss function in our framework. Table 4 reports
the adversarial robustness of our decentralized framework w.r.t. FGSM attack ( = 0.3) on MNIST
with IID setting. It can be observed that (1) our framework with MSE loss function has significantly
larger running time; (2) the robustness of our framework with MSE loss function becomes slightly
weaker when using the MSE loss function, which might be induced by the weakness of MSE loss
function in the classification problem setting.
Clean Decent_BVABiasOnly VarianceOnly BVA
Cross-entropy 0.5875 (38.13s) 0.7627 (47.58s) 0.7594 (63.46s) 0.7756 (63.67s)
MSE 0.6011 (39.67s) 0.7112 (65.03s) 0.7108 (162.40s) 0.7119 (179.60s)
Table 4: Adversarial robustness with different loss functions and running time (second/epoch)
8.3.2 BV-PGD v.s. BV-FGSM
Our bias-variance attack could be naturally generalized to any gradient-based adversarial attack
algorithms when the gradients of bias B(·) and variance V (·) w.r.t. x are tractable to be estimated
from finite training sets. Here we empirically compare the adversarial robustness of our framework
with BV-PGD or BV-FGSM. Table 5 provides our results on w.r.t. FGSM and PGD attacks ( = 0.3)
on MNIST with IID and non-IID settings. Compared to FedAvg, our framework Decent_BVA with
either BV-FGSM or BV-PGD could largely improve the model robustness against adversarial noise.
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IID non-IID
Clean FGSM PGD-10 PGD-20 Clean FGSM PGD-10 PGD-20
FedAvg - 0.9863 0.5875 0.6203 0.2048 0.9462 0.1472 0.5254 0.0894
Decent_BVA
(BV-FGSM training)
BiasOnly 0.9840 0.7627 0.7671 0.5154 0.9597 0.6510 0.6226 0.3614
VarianceOnly 0.9834 0.7594 0.7616 0.5253 0.9577 0.5979 0.5990 0.3504
BVA 0.9837 0.7756 0.7927 0.5699 0.9671 0.6696 0.6953 0.4717
Decent_BVA
(BV-PGD training)
BiasOnly 0.9817 0.7578 0.8455 0.6422 0.9690 0.6585 0.7868 0.5749
VarianceOnly 0.9850 0.7419 0.8226 0.6076 0.9688 0.6293 0.7587 0.5299
BVA 0.9849 0.7565 0.8399 0.6317 0.9670 0.6592 0.7836 0.5752
Table 5: Adversarial robustness with BV-PGD and BV-FGSM
8.3.3 Parameter Analysis
In this part, we perform parameter analysis regarding a few key hyper-parameters that have high
influence on the model performance. Since our target is to train a decentralized model where the
robustness of the model is high but the accuracy still remains. For that purpose, we have the following
three sets of experimental plots to guide us choosing the optimal hyper-parameters used in the
experiments.
Figure 6: Accuracy of clean train-
ing with varying ns
Figure 7: Robustness under
FGSM attack with varying ns
Figure 8: Robustness under PGD-
20 attack with varying ns
Number of shared perturbed samples ns. From Fig. 6, we see that the accuracy of FedAvg (i.e.,
ns = 0) has the best accuracy as we expected. For Decent_BVA with varying size of asymmetrical
transmitted perturbed samples (i.e., ns = 8, 16, 32, 64), its performance drops slightly with increasing
ns (on average drop of 0.05% per plot). As a comparison, the robustness on test set Dtest increases
dramatically with increasing ns (increasing ranges from 18% to 22% under FGSM attack and ranges
from 15% to 60% under PGD-20 attack). However, choosing large ns would have high model
robustness but also suffer from the high communication cost. In experiment, we choose ns = 64 for
the ideal trade-off point.
Figure 9: Accuracy of clean train-
ing with varying momentum
Figure 10: Robustness under
FGSM attack with varying mo-
mentum
Figure 11: Robustness under
PGD-20 attack with varying mo-
mentum
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Momentum. We also care about the choice of options in the SGD optimizer’s settings. As seen in
Fig. 9, the accuracy of clean training is monotonically increase with momentum. Interestingly, we
also observe that the decentralized model is less vulnerable when momentum is large no matter the
adversarial attack is FGSM or PGD-20 on test set Dtest, see Fig. 10 and Fig. 11. This phenomenon is
also monotonically observed when we changing momentum from 0.1 to 0.9 and this suggests us to
choose momentum as 0.9 through all experiments.
Figure 12: Accuracy of clean
training with varying local epoch
Figure 13: Robustness under
FGSM attack with varying local
epoch
Figure 14: Robustness under
PGD-20 attack with varying local
epoch
Local epochs E. The third important factor of decentralized training is the number of epoch E we
should use. In Fig. 12, we clearly see that more local epochs in each client leads to more accurate
aggregated server model in prediction. Similarly, its robustness against both FGSM and PGD-20
attack on test set Dtest also have the best performance when local epochs are large on device. Hence,
in our experiments, if the on-device computational cost is not very high (large data example size,
model with many layers), we choose E = 50. Otherwise, we will reduce E to a smaller number
accordingly.
8.4 Network Architectures
For the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST data sets, the CNN network structure is shared since the input
image examples have the same dimensions. The detail is shown in Table. 6. Conv1 and Conv2 denote
the convolution block that may have one or more convolution layers. E.g., [5× 5, 10]× 1 denotes 1
cascaded convolution layers with 10 filters of size 5× 5.
Layers CNN-MNIST
Conv1 [5 × 5, 10] × 1
Pool1 2 × 2 Max Pooling, Stride 2
Conv2 [5 × 5, 20] × 1
Dropout 0.5
Pool2 2 × 2 Max Pooling, Stride 2
FC1 50
FC2 10
Table 6: CNN architecture for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST
For the CIFAR data set, the CNN network structure is shown in Table. 7. It should be noticed that
state-of-the-art approaches have achieved a better test accuracy for CIFAR, nevertheless, this model
is sufficient for our experimental needs since our goal is to evaluate the robust decentralized model
instead of achieving the best possible accuracy on testing stage.
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Layers CNN-CIFAR
Conv1 [3 × 3, 32] × 1
Conv2 [3 × 3, 64] × 1
Pool1 2 × 2 Max Pooling, Stride 2
Conv3 [3 × 3, 128] × 2
Pool2 2 × 2 Max Pooling, Stride 2
Dropout 0.05
Conv4 [3 × 3, 256] × 2
Pool3 2 × 2 Max Pooling, Stride 2
Dropout 0.1
FC1 1024
FC2 512
Dropout 0.1
FC3 10
Table 7: CNN architecture for CIFAR-10
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